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TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL 
CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION IN ATROCITY 
 







The legal doctrine that assign blame for international crimes are 
numerous, unclear, ever-changing and often conceptually problematic. In 
this essay, I question the prudence of retaining the radical doctrinal 
heterogeneity that, in large part, produces this state of disarray. Instead of 
tolerating different standards of participation across customary 
international law, the ICC Statute and national systems of criminal law, I 
argue for a universal concept of participation that would apply whenever 
an international crime is charged, regardless of the jurisdiction hearing 
the case. Although I have argued elsewhere that a unitary theory of 
perpetration should serve this role, I here attempt to remain agnostic 
about the content of the universal system for which I advocate. In so 
doing, I isolate the question of universality from the theory of 
responsibility that would fill it, querying why so much energy is invested 
in generating treaties to harmonize definitions of international crimes, 
when no comparable initiative exists for the modes of participation these 
crimes couple with. I conclude this call for a universal notion of 
participation in atrocity by suggesting that the current disarray in this 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The legal mechanisms that link individual agency to atrocity are 
numerous, difficult to identify, perpetually changing, and not infrequently, 
conceptually questionable. From aiding and abetting to indirect co-
perpetration, there is little settled understanding of how international 
crimes are attributed to a particular individual. In this Chapter, I argue that 
instead of continuing to embrace the radical doctrinal heterogeneity that, 
in large part, produces this disarray in modes of participation for 
international crimes, we should promulgate a universal set of standards 
that resolves these issues once and for all. We have treaties for 
international crimes like genocide, war crimes, and soon crimes against 
humanity,1 but not for forms of participation in these crimes that very 
much colour what it means to be responsible for an international offence. 
Why the anomaly?  In what follows, I propose that we overcome this great 
discrepancy by agreeing on a global set of standards governing blame 
attribution for international crimes wherever they are tried. 
 How would this universal concept work? With a global notion of 
participation in atrocity like I propose, all national and international trials 
would apply common standards of attribution where international crimes 
are charged, but revert to normal domestic rules for other offences. If a 
national court hears a formal allegation of genocide, international 
standards of participation would immediately apply. In what follows, I set 
out ten arguments that favor this universalist approach to participation 
over the troubled waters in which the discipline presently finds itself 
adrift. I start, then, by noting how the current struggles stem, in large part, 
from the interaction of three different sources of law: customary 
international law, principles enshrined in the ICC Statute and rules 
governing participation in national legal systems. My thesis is that the 
interrelation of the three layers of law governing participation ends up 
inhibiting rather than enabling justice, and I question whether litigation is 
the appropriate means of resolving these ambiguities.    
 Forms of participation for international crimes currently arise at three 
intervals. First, customary international law governs modes of 
participation in a large number of international tribunals. And yet, if 
common law systems did away with customary rules of criminal law, 
created by judges, many decades ago (because their imprecision violated 
basic human rights principles and core tenets of liberalism),2 why are 
                                                
1 FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 
2011). 
2  See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of 
Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008). 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 4 
   
international courts still doing differently? This question is particularly 
vexing when the vagaries of customary international law allow for 
radically divergent interpretations. Since the Tadić judgment, for example, 
the ICTY and numerous other international tribunals had tried and 
convicted a host of individuals under the third variant of joint criminal 
enterprise liability (‘JCE’).3 But decades later, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia finds that this mode 
of attribution was probably never an element of custom.4 A universal 
concept of participation would prevent this type of contradiction. 
 Second, the ICC Statute codifies a set of standards for criminal 
attribution within a treaty regime, but this creates as many problems as it 
solves. Many states are not parties to the ICC Statute (not, presumably, 
because of the Statute’s provisions governing participation). Even within 
the terms of the statute itself, few agree on the interpretation to be given to 
standards of participation, except to concede that they are incoherent.5 
Moreover, the Statute purports to leave customary international law intact 
at the same time that it marks a significant instantiation of state practice 
on these issues.6 Against this backdrop, judges and scholars dispute 
whether the open-textured nature of the Statute allows for the invocation 
of a wide variety of German modes of participation. The difficulty is that, 
as other judges push back against this invocation, standards of blame 
attribution become exceptionally difficult to identify with any degree of 
confidence. In what follows, I express some skepticism about the view 
that judges will settle on a defensible Dogmatik with time.  
 Third, national courts are increasingly assigned the lead role in 
prosecuting international crimes, as part of what Kathryn Sikkink 
                                                
3 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 227 (May 7, 1997) (referring to 
joint criminal enterprise as a “mode of participation”). 
4 Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE), Ieng Sary et al., Case File No. 002-19-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), 
PTC, ECCC, 10 May 2010, para. 83 (‘For the foregoing reasons, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
does not find that the authorities relied upon in Tadić … constitute a sufficiently firm 
basis to conclude that JCE III formed part of customary international law at the time 
relevant to Case 002.’). 
5 See, for instance, [LJIL Article to be cited instead]:  Jens David Ohlin et al, Assessing 
the Control-Theory, 26 LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 725, 744 (2013). ('Moreover, it is highly 
questionable whether Article 25(3) is based on a single coherent, normative theory of 
participation. Nothing in the drafting history of the ICC suggests that Article 25(3) was to 
constitute a self-contained system of criminal participation with a coherent doctrinal 
grounding.'). But cf. Chapter by G. Werle/B. Burghardt in this volume. 
6 Art. 10 ICC Statute (‘Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing 
in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this 
Statute.’). 
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memorably calls a ‘Justice Cascade.’7 While this deluge of national trials 
for international crimes is a very welcome (if long awaited) development, 
it adds to the normative ambiguity in modes of participation. Whether 
national courts should employ local modes of participation that are 
indigenous to the criminal law within the forum, or borrow international 
modes in keeping with the global character of the crime in question, is 
unclear. Even if judges do favor the international laws governing 
participation, they still face a daunting second-order question: which 
international law to apply? As we just witnessed at the two prior levels, 
the ICC Statute may clash with custom, and custom can generate 
conflicting interpretations. Regrettably, these dilemmas are not 
exceptional—they are hallmarks of a global legal disunity on issues of 
criminal participation that undermines the aspirations of international 
criminal justice as a project.  
 In what follows, I set out ten reasons for states to negotiate a universal 
notion of participation for international crimes based on a model 
academics agree on, which informs a new treaty as well as amendments to 
the ICC Statute. Alternatively, academics could lead a process that creates 
a model system of participation, similar to the Corpus Juris in Europe, the 
Model Penal Code in the United States or the UN Model Laws at an 
international level. My list of reasons substantiating this argument reads 
like a catalogue insofar as I resist the desire to group the factors favoring 
this universalization of participation, or categorize them by type. 
Similarly, I do not offer arguments against this universalist position, since 
excellent authors already offer thoughtful reasons why we should embrace 
and manage the exercising legal heterogeneity throughout the world, 
rather than giving in to the knee-jerk desire for uniformity.8 Instead, I list 
here a set of problems I believe militate in favor of universal uniformity 
instead of rampant doctrinal divergence, in the hope of broadening an 
existing discussion.  
 Finally, for the purposes of this paper, I attempt to remain agnostic 
about what the content of this universal notion of participation should be. 
In the interests of fully disclosure, I have elsewhere argued that a unitary 
theory of perpetration should serve this purpose,9 and I remain convinced 
that a variant of the unitary theory of perpetration is symbolically most 
appropriate, normatively preferable, and politically plausible as an option 
                                                
7 KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (1 ed. 2011). 
8 Paul Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S.CAL.L.REV. 1155 (2007); Alexander K. A. 
Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063 (2011). 
9 James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 
LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 165 (2012). 
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for the universal standard I suggest. Nonetheless, I do my best to extricate 
this preference from my argument in this Chapter as much as possible 
(even if I suspect I sometimes fail). I am convinced that the question of 
universality and content come apart, and that the former requires 
considerably more discussion, regardless of how universal forms of 
participation are configured. In that spirit, what arguments can be 
marshaled for universalizing the rules governing participation in 
international crimes instead of tolerating the extant doctrinal heterogeneity 
across the three levels I set out? 
 
II. TEN REASONS FOR A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION IN 
ATROCITY 
A. Ensuring a Level Playing Field 
 
 International crimes frequently cross territorial borders before, during, 
and after the execution of the offence. After orchestrating the calls to 
butchery in Rwanda, for instance, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza fled to 
Cameroon. Terrorist organizations responsible for systematic attacks on 
civilians in various parts of the world co-ordinate and launch their 
operations from multiple sites, as do the military and intelligence 
personnel who conduct excessive counter-terrorist operations to interdict 
them. Foreign governments act as puppet masters for rebel groups’ 
oftentimes brutal conduct, and companies incorporated in one country, 
operating out of another, whose officers come from different states again, 
flood foreign conflict zones with weaponry that enables atrocity. And yet, 
if standards of criminal responsibility differ from one jurisdiction to the 
next, we promote races to the regulatory bottom, thereby tolerating legal 
safe harbours that impede accountability in these sorts of scenarios.  
 This problem is not new to international law, and it is surprising that it 
has not featured in discussions of international criminal law more 
conspicuously until now. Addressing races to the bottom was, for 
example, a core motivation for the UN Convention Against Corruption.10 
The fear was that, if anti-corruption were left to national legal systems 
alone, companies in jurisdictions like the United States that had muscular 
forms of anti-corruption legislation in place, would be prejudiced vis-à-vis 
foreign competitors. If that were not trouble enough, companies could 
                                                
10 Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed in the Interests of 
Justice, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305–348, 193 (2005); Kevin E. Davis, The Prospects for Anti-
corruption Law: Optimists versus Skeptics, 4 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 319 (2012). 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 7 
   
simply relocate to jurisdictions where chances of accountability were 
slight. International law governing corruption emerged as an attempt to 
establish a global baseline whose universalism precluded these evasive 
strategies. The question is, why is there no equivalent thinking in 
standards of criminal participation, at least for crimes that shock the 
proverbial conscience of mankind?  
 After all, moments do arise where criminal law is universalized to 
address globalized phenomena. Take the UN Security Council Resolution 
1368 of 12 September 2001, that called on all states to ensure that ‘those 
responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.’11 
Subsequently, the UN Security Council passed another resolution 
requiring all states to criminalize terrorist financing,12 in a bid to ensure 
that criminal laws with a particular scope and effect were firmly in place 
globally to combat a transnational phenomenon. Of course, this quasi-
legislative act was controversial in that it was probably beyond the 
Security Council’s remit,13 but it does highlight a stark disparity with 
international law governing modes of attribution for international crimes. 
Is it not peculiar that a terrible set of terrorist acts in a single country could 
generate this attempt to universalize certain criminal laws, when atrocities 
of all stripes spread throughout the world over a much longer period have 
escaped that project, even during a period of light-speed growth in the 
field? 
 Instead, universalist aspirations in international criminal law are only 
expressed in important campaigns for new treaties governing international 
crimes. The great efforts of Raphael Lemkin, culminated in the passage of 
the Genocide Convention, convinced as he was that new legislation would 
have an appreciable effect on ensuring that the sufferings of the Second 
World War would not be relived.14 Likewise, the post-war period also saw 
the codification of war crimes for the first time in treaty form, under the 
                                                
11 UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001), S/RES/1368, 12 September 2001. 
12 UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001, stating that the 
Security Council ‘Decides that all States shall:… (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or 
collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they 
are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts’. 
13  See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L LAW 
175 (2005). 
14 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd. 2nd ed. 2008) (2008).I accept that the Genocide convention also 
prohibited attempt and complicity, although the precise meaning of these terms is not 
announced in the treaty. 
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rubric of the grave breaches regime.15 When it came to addressing modes 
of attribution for these grave breaches, however, states proved strangely 
recalcitrant, offering “only keywords to designate a criminal act, nothing 
which can be called a definition.”16 Finally, we now witness convincing 
arguments for forging a treaty governing crimes against humanity, to 
unify at least three different understandings of these offenses within the 
discipline.17 While all these initiatives are praiseworthy, it is anomalous 
that they limit themselves to international crimes, when forms of 
participation colour the meaning of these offenses so thoroughly.  
 If we are motivated to create a universal system of international 
criminal justice that does not tolerate normative safe harbours, this 
anomaly requires correction. 
B. Restraining Illiberal Excess 
 
 At times, the forms of participation that couple with international 
crimes risk converting a criminal trial into an illiberal instrument for 
social control. At an international level, this difficulty arises where 
international courts reach for permissive domestic doctrine so as to 
enmesh a broad range of big fish, for an even broader range of criminal 
harm. As I have argued elsewhere, JCE III fits this description well: an 
English doctrine initially imported into international criminal law through 
WWII jurisprudence, then corroborated in modern practice by the parallel 
existence of equivalent concepts in a range of predominantly Anglophone 
jurisdictions.18 As very numerous scholars have pointed out, however, 
JCE III tolerates a sharp cleavage between the definition of crimes and 
modes of liability used to convict defendants of them, which many take to 
violate the cardinal principle of culpability.19 A universal concept of 
                                                
15 For a dicussion of grave breaches and their confusing, overlapping relationship with 
other war crimes, see James G. Stewart, The Future of the Grave Breaches Regime, 7 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 855 (2009). 
16 Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, 392 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds, 2002). 
17 FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1. 
18 Stewart, supra note 9 at 172–178. 
19 Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 159, 174 (2007) (concluding that relative to other aspects of JCE, “the conflict of 
JCE III with the principle of culpability is more fundamental”); George P. Fletcher & 
Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur 
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 548 (2005) (arguing that “the doctrine [JCE] itself is 
substantively overbroad and transgresses basic principles of legality that limit 
punishment to personal culpability.”); Danner and Martinez, supra note __, at 134 
(arguing that JCE poses significant challenges to the culpability principle). 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 9 
   
participation should act as a restraint against the adoption of doctrine like 
this.   
 Aside from these more mundane examples, the restraining force of a 
universal concept of participation could also prove very useful in states 
that find themselves in the throes of mass violence. Recall that, in truth, 
domestic criminal law is frequently part and parcel of the problem 
international criminal justice exists to address—it was criminal law that 
served as a vehicle for many of both Hitler and Stalin’s most terrifying 
excesses.20 In other less extreme contexts, the history of criminal law is 
still one of extensive instrumentalization by a cadre of elites to further 
partial social and political agenda. Modes of participation in particular, are 
a key component of this darker underbelly of the national criminal justice 
systems international criminal lawyers too quickly defers to. For the 
reasons I mention, the principled, proportionate, and fair application of 
criminal law norms to the guilty may well be the exception not the rule 
globally. We are therefore unwise to uncritically bow to domestic 
doctrine, when the history beneath it is frequently badly stained. 
 Instead of leaving international crimes to couple with whatever forms 
of participation might be on offer, in either the domestic or international 
sphere, should we not construct standards of blame attribution that 
conform with basic ideas in liberal theory? As almost everyone agrees, 
this necessitates treating the principle of culpability as sacrosanct. To 
paraphrase an example from H.L.A. Hart, whatever we think the purpose 
of mounting international prosecutions might be,21 we surely cannot 
punish the mother of an offender in the hope that this will prevent atrocity 
– it may well do so, but the mother is not guilty.22 Punishment without 
guilt is anathema to a liberal conception of the institution. And yet, the 
painful truth is that many criminal jurisdictions have an ambivalent 
commitment to this principle of guilt, and as a matter of practice, much 
global criminal law dispenses with the constraint. By insisting more 
forcefully on culpability, a universal standard of participation could guard 
against trials for international crimes being tainted by these objectionable 
influences.  
 Put differently, for international criminal justice to safeguard its self-
image as a solution to (not facilitator of) human rights violations, it must 
                                                
20 For a harrowing account of criminal law under Stalin and Hitler, see RICHARD 
VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005). 
21  These purposes are often remain implicit and contradictory in practice. See Mirjan 
Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
329 (2008); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 
EUR. J. OF INT'L L 561 (2002). 
22 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY  : ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
5–6 (Rev. ed. ed. 1984). 
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discontinue the habits of unconditionally surrendering issues of 
participation to whatever standard is at hand. This not only means that 
international criminal courts and tribunals should be slow to absorb 
national laws into the international sphere without careful normative 
scrutiny of their content, it also suggests that the international community 
should have much more to say about the content of rules governing 
participation when they couple with international crimes in domestic 
trials. If we care about international criminal law being instrumentalized 
for illiberal purposes, both these concerns require us to construct a set of 
standards that at least fence off the possibility of excess. At present, the 
radical doctrinal heterogeneity that characterizes modes of participation 
internationally falls well short of this protective posture.    
 
C. Preventing Arbitrary Choices of Criminal Law 
 
 Where there are two or more standards of criminal attribution on offer, 
and no second-order rules that mandate priorities where conflict arises 
between them, judges make determinations of guilt or innocence based on 
choice of law. This may well epitomize private international law, but its 
application in a criminal context breeds arbitrariness a liberal system 
should endeavor to eliminate. Note, before we begin, how peculiar this 
choice of law is for received wisdom about criminal law in many systems. 
As Markus Dubber points out, in the United States, territoriality is still the 
primary manifestation of the power to punish, such that ‘choice of law 
questions cannot arise in American criminal cases, since no sovereign 
could assert another’s authority’.23 In cases involving international crimes, 
however, the fact that public international law remains silent about the 
modes of attribution that must attach to international crimes, means that 
even in the United States, courts will be forced to make elections between 
standards of participation derived from different systems. Sometimes, 
these elections determine guilt. 
 Consider the issue presently on appeal before the DC Circuit, in the 
case concerning the criminal responsibility of an alleged member of al-
Qaeda held at Guantánamo named Al Buhlul.24 Several years ago, the US 
                                                
23 Markus Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (OXFORD HANDBOOKS) , 1290–1291 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2008). 
24 For a helpful summary of the litigation, including relevant court documents, see the 
wiki established by Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/military-
commissions/ali-hamza-ahmad-suliman-al-bahlul/ (last accessed 13 August, 2013). 
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Military Commission for Guantanamo convicted Al Buhlul of material 
support to terrorism for, among other things, producing a horrendously 
violent movie inciting anti-American sentiment and glorifying violence. 
The problem is, the Military Commission’s jurisdiction was limited to 
violations of the laws of war, international law determined the content of 
that body of law, and ‘[m]aterial support for terrorism was not a war crime 
under the law of war’.25 But the US government has appealed on the 
grounds that this form of participating in a war crime was well grounded 
in ‘the American common law of war’,26 i.e. national criminal law. 
Whatever might be said about the merit of the argument, it is plainly 
undesirable for guilt and innocence for one and the same crime, to turn on 
a seemingly open choice of law. 
 To avoid this conundrum, should we not transcend these difficulties by 
arriving at a universal system of criminal responsibility for international 
crimes? This would mean that in the Guantánamo case, for instance, we 
would obviate the need for litigation on the source of modes of attribution 
for international crimes, since the issue would be clear. We would already 
know what the scope of international responsibility was because we would 
have specified this for all international crimes, before all possible fora, 
ahead of time. This universal, exhaustive, and principled specification 
would allow the application of global standards in this case, protecting the 
defendant against overly zealous retributive sentiment (a natural danger 
inherent in all criminal justice during war). At the same time, this 
universal standard would also allow states to categorically reject 
allegations of manipulating international law to enable their excessive 
response to security threats. In both senses, a universal standard prevents 
arbitrary choices of law from having pernicious effects on the system. 
 
D. Establishing Clear Standards 
 
 Ambiguity is a related by-product of radical doctrinal heterogeneity in 
modes of participation for international crimes. At present, the 
overlapping nature of modes of participation that stem from a whole host 
of jurisdictions creates a system whose contours remain constantly 
opaque. For instance, if one is to ask the fairly basic question, ‘what is the 
law governing accomplice liability of arms vendors?’, one should expect a 
straight answer if we are concerned that responsibility for international 
                                                
25 Salim Ahmed Hamdan v.  United States of America, 696 F.3d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
26 Ibid., at 1252 (emphasis in original). 
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crimes should mean something reasonably stable across an international 
community. Unfortunately, the intense divergence between standards that 
could apply depending on context, preclude any meaningful answer that is 
not wholly contingent. If this raises the alarm that members of civil 
society throughout the world cannot actually ascertain what these criminal 
standards are, it produces an equal threat that these actors are themselves 
unable to comport with pre-established rules. The current system trades 
clarity for doctrinal diversity. 
 If one attempts to answer the relatively simple question across the three 
levels of law governing participation, this tradeoff becomes plain. Let us 
start with the ICC treaty. During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, 
states adopted the standard for complicity contained in the U.S. Model 
Penal Code (MPC), requiring that the accomplice must provide assistance 
with the ‘purpose’ of facilitating the crime in question. At first blush, this 
was a strange choice given that, to the best of my knowledge, only 3 of 
195 national jurisdictions in the world adopt a standard for complicity that 
even mentions ‘purpose’.27 The peculiarity increases when one 
acknowledges that ‘purpose’ does not mean anything like what most 
international criminal lawyers attribute to the concept—most believe that 
it exonerates indifferent assistance, requiring the accomplice to display a 
concrete volition towards the consummated crime, for example, by 
providing the weapon wanting civilians to be killed with it.28 Closer 
inspection of the MPC reveals something very different. 
 The U.S. Model Penal Code (from whence all purpose standards for 
complicity originate) does not understand the term “purpose” in this 
manner. The MPC also states that  
 
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an 
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the 
commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if 
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of 
the offense.29  
 
                                                
27 Admittedly, I count all of the state jurisdictions in the United States as one, even 
though many of them mention “purpose”. Note, however, this this almost never means 
what international criminal lawyers assume. See further below. 
28 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion 
in the Courts, 6 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2007); SARAH FINNIN, 38 ELEMENTS 
OF ACCESSORIAL MODES OF LIABILITY: ARTICLE 25(3)(B) AND (C) OF THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2012); Chimene I Keitner, Conceptualizing 
Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008). 
29 See 29 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 
PART I § 2.06(4)  296 (1985). (emphasis added). 
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As leading American scholars acknowledge, this means that the purpose 
requirement goes only to the provision of the assistance (the arms vendor 
wanted to sell the weapon), leaving the mental element in the crime with 
which the accomplice is charged to determine the culpability requisite for 
the attendant consequences.30 Thus, if recklessness suffices for crimes 
against humanity, the arms vendor may be responsible if she is reckless 
about whether the weapon would enable that consequence. The difference 
is enormous, but unclear based on the interpretations this concept has 
received from international lawyers that purport to apply custom to date.  
 At the ad hoc tribunals, the mental element required for complicity is 
knowledge, but this standard frequently dilutes into recklessness in 
practice.31 Future events cannot be known with certainty, and because 
complicity by definition must involve assistance prior to future criminal 
activity by a principal, complicity invariably boils down to an awareness 
of risk. This, of course, is not peculiar to international tribunals, they 
borrowed this legal position from national courts that do similarly.32 If that 
slippage in the subjective realm is slightly disorienting, it pales in 
comparison to the addition of ‘specific direction’ as an element of the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law.33 As I have 
argued elsewhere, this newly adopted standard is not only exceptionally 
difficult to imagine as an element of the actus reus, it has no meaningful 
support in customary international law, national practice, or criminal 
theory.34 Thus, to the ambiguities of the ICC statue, add the vagaries of 
customary international law. 
 Now assume that an arms vendor is charged in a national court for 
complicity in the atrocities his commerce enabled. Would a national court 
hearing a case involving complicity in international crimes apply the 
standard of purpose as to the final criminal outcome (the apparent ICC 
standard), purpose as to the assistance plus whatever mental element is 
required for the crime (the correct interpretation of the MPC standard), 
knowledge as in virtual certainty (the formal customary requirement) or 
just a substantial probability (the standard most frequently applied in 
practice)? Or, would it again be justified in applying national criminal 
                                                
30 The negotiating history of the MPC, leading American scholars, and 47 out of 50 state 
jurisdictions in the United States support this interpretation of  “purpose.” I explore this 
interpretation in a forthcoming article entitled see James G. Stewart, The Competitive 
Advantage of Corporate Responsibility for International Crimes: Justice After Kiobel, J. 
of INT’L CRIM. L (forthcoming). 
31 Stewart, supra note 9 at 192–194. 
32 Id. at 192–193. 
33 See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement, (Feb. 28, 2013). 
34 For a complete list of my writings against “specific direction,” links to them and a 
summary of each, see http://www.law.ubc.ca/faculty/stewart/direction.html. 
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notions like dolus eventualis, which are lower again? In the physical 
realm, will these courts require some form of causal linkage between the 
accomplice’s actions and the completed offence, and if so, how will they 
address the bizarre ‘specific direction’ requirement that is alien to their 
own national law and that governing complicity everywhere else?  
 Suddenly, the simple question seems anything but. If we care about 
clarity in the system, should there not be some attempt at resolving these 
sorts of ambiguities once and for all, in one foul swoop, for all 
jurisdictions that might try international crimes? Perhaps Anne-Marie 
Slaughter is right that judicial globalization will deliver this shared 
understanding in good time,35 but that seems speculative in this field, 
where competing doctrine, judicial socializations, and political affiliations 
are likely to run against this current. What, too, of the rights of the 
accused along the way? (Not to mention the acquittals of those arms 
vendors who are morally very blameworthy on a defensible concept of 
complicity).  For these and all the other reasons I set out here, academics 
should generate a doctrinal position that is both clear and universal. 
   
E. Neutral Standards Elected Not Imposed 
 
 In a way, the ICC Statute is a testament to the political horse-trading 
that produces criminal codes that leave all participants slightly 
exasperated with the compromise they are forced to live with. Be that as it 
may, political power has proved the strongest determinant of normative 
content in modes of attribution. By no small coincidence, the 
differentiated system of attribution presently in force internationally 
mirrors that in place in all of the largest Western economic and military 
powers. The problem is, in a global project that aspires to universality, the 
dominance of French, English, American, and German criminal law in 
international criminal law can symbolize a continuation of the imperialist 
histories of coercion that left much of the world with criminal law that 
was imposed not freely chosen.  
 Consider colonialism. Criminal law was consistently at the vanguard of 
colonialism, both overt and implicit. By a process that commenced with 
an Indian Penal Code, for example, the British impregnated much of the 
territory it had forcibly acquired in the European rush to empire with legal 
principles that were drafted in London then applied with astonishing 
insensitivity to local conditions. I first attended a university in a city called 
                                                
35 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1103 (2000). 
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Dunedin, in New Zealand. That city boasts the steepest paved street in the 
world, which is a product of colonial town planners literally dropping the 
map of the Scottish capital Edinburgh in a new antipodean geography: the 
names of streets and their proportions to one another are identical, even 
when they go straight up a cliff face. The transposition of criminal law to 
the colonies followed a similar logic, meaning that much criminal law 
doctrine remains the relic of an incomplete process of decolonization 
(where it was attempted at all). Needless to say, this may produce a real 
degree of social alienation from extant criminal law. 
 In other places, like Japan, the country itself adopted a European model 
of criminal law rather than having it physically imposed. Nonetheless, the 
variation was one of degree not type. In the case of Japan, it reluctantly 
decided to adopt the German criminal code when would-be colonizing 
powers forced it to elect between colonialism of a more traditional sort, 
and amending the internal system of government to make way for 
capitalist expansion from the ‘civilized’ world. As Antony Anghie points 
out in chilling detail, international law was entirely onboard with the 
gunboat diplomacy that facilitated this agenda, by erecting ‘standards of 
civilization’ that predicated international recognition (and therefore an 
ability to ward off colonial imposition), on having internally enacted the 
changes physical colonization would achieve.36 Predictably, this lose-lose 
option produces criminal standards that that can well leave a bad taste in a 
local population’s mouth. 
 The question is, should international criminal law unquestioningly 
draw on modes of participation produced by these ugly histories? If we are 
concerned about local values, the answer will often be no. Scholars of 
comparative law show that many states will seek to avoid adopting legal 
standards that still touch sore historical wounds—to venture from criminal 
law momentarily, some argue that Canadian constitutional law is more 
influential as a model for imitation globally than that in the United States, 
not just because of the idiosyncrasies of the very particular American 
constitutional form, but also because ‘Canada has the virtue of not being 
the United States’.37 For instance, when it comes to taking legal advice on 
constitutional reform, Vietnam avoids both the United States and France 
with some vehemence, drawing instead on Danish advice.38 If 
international criminal law continues to adopt standards from dominant 
                                                
36 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 72–91 (2007). 
37 FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE POLITICS AND INCENTIVES OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION 
256–257 (2000). 
38 Ibid., at 260. 
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western powers, is it again imposing alien rules, without sensitivity to 
historical wounds?  
 Certainly, one does not have to travel far to unearth uncomfortable 
continuities between international criminal law, colonialism, and the 
domestic criminal law that was imposed throughout that dark process. We 
could point to the spirited dissent of the Indian Judge at the Tokyo 
Tribunal to flesh out these embarrassing points of continuity, or to the 
testimony of Göring at Nuremberg, who responded to questions about the 
German policy of Lebensraum (living space for the German people) that 
lead to intervention in Russia and beyond, by saying ‘I fully understand 
that the four signatory powers [to the Nuremberg Charter] who call three 
quarters of the world their own explain the idea differently.’39 Surely, to 
distance this discipline from this terrible history and do our best to 
appease modern allegations that international criminal law is neo-colonial 
in structure, we should rethink international modes of participation along 
more neutral lines. That analytical process might clear the ground for 
criminal standards that embody truly universal values, instead of treating 
existing criminal doctrine throughout the world as necessarily reflective of 
cultural diversity worth celebrating. 
 
F. Abandoning Custom as a Source of Law Governing Criminal 
Participation 
 
We are all familiar with the label ‘victor’s justice’ and its origins at 
Nuremberg,40 where Allies tried only the vanquished (despite no end of 
Allied offending) and staged some quite remarkable legal acrobatics in 
order to establish individual criminal responsibility at an international 
level. The Hague Regulations of 1907 made no mention of war crimes; the 
Kellogg–Briand Pact prohibited aggression but individual criminal 
responsibility was again conspicuously absent, and crimes against 
humanity were not enshrined in any treaties, let alone ones that bound the 
parties to those particular proceedings. Consequently, Allied courts 
                                                
39 GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME  : WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (2007). 
40 For modern discussions, see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, in 
6 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 1-35 (J.A. Frowein and R. 
Wolfrum eds.,2002); A. GARAPON, DES CRIMES QU’ON NE PEUT NI PUNIR NI PARDONER 
(Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002), chapitre 2; G.J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE 
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 8-20 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000); G. SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17 (New Hampshire: Polity Press, 2007). 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 17 
   
bravely set about forging a new set of norms governing individual 
criminal responsibility, on the unashamedly open basis that the prohibition 
against retroactive criminal law was only a ‘principle of justice’ to be 
weighed against others.41 
 The United Nations Security Council did not want to be tarred with this 
brush. When it resolved to establish the ICTY, the UN Secretary General 
appealed to customary international law, precisely in order to differentiate 
this second phase of international trials from the “victor’s justice” 
dispensed at Nuremberg. As such, the ICTY would need to establish the 
existence of each and every aspect of the law they applied in customary 
international law, to avoid the spectacle of inventing crimes après coup or 
accusations that the Security Council had assumed legislative capacity. 
This newfound commitment to the principle of legality (frequently 
honoured in the breach),42 created a headache for practitioners, scholars, 
and participants who attempted to comply. When a defendant raised the 
morally innocuous question about whether the war crime of deportation 
required expulsion across a national border or not, lawyers would 
painstakingly paw over ICRC studies, military manuals and state 
legislation, in an attempt to divine conformity with a standard for custom 
that resists concrete meaning.43 Should a universal notion of participation 
in atrocity not discontinue this practice? 
 Observe, for instance, the anomaly of customary international criminal 
law more broadly. In public international law, custom is more than 
slightly mercurial. As Martti Koskiennemi famously argued, custom is 
quite “useless” at generating definitive standards.44 So, if recourse to 
custom creates problems of credibility in other areas of international 
law,45 it is especially problematic in a criminal law context when the 
principle of legality, liberal notions of punishment, and international 
human rights are all jeopardized. Unsurprisingly, few other systems of 
criminal justice allow such a vague source of law to create criminal 
                                                
41 Judgment, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 462 
(1948). 
42 Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal 
Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
43 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 91–98 (Mar 22, 2006). 
44 Martti Koskenniemi, Review : The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 
1952 (1990). This, as Koskiennimi memorably argues, “because the interpretation of 
‘state behavior’ or ‘state will’ is not an automatic operation but involves the choice and 
use of conceptual matrices that are controversial and that usually allow one to argue 
either way.” 
45 For criticism of the over-use of custom in international human rights law, see Bruno 
Simma & Philip Alston, Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles, The, 12 AUST. YBIL 82, 88 (1988).  
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responsibility? True, common law traditionally allowed judge-made 
crimes of various types, but that historical tradition was uniformly 
discontinued across the Commonwealth some decades ago. As Beth van 
Schaack explains, this shift grew out of a gradual recognition that custom 
and criminal responsibility are antithetical.46 Why does international 
criminal law plan on doing differently? 
 The consequences are significant. To recall the example we began 
with, the famed Tadić judgment incorporated a third variety of joint 
criminal enterprise, which allowed all participants in a joint criminal 
enterprise to be held responsible for crimes committed beyond those 
agreed, provided they were ‘a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
common purpose’.47 Thus, a soldier who participates as a driver in a joint 
attempt to capture and torture a high-level enemy is responsible for 
murder when the prisoner is beaten to death, even though he never struck 
a single blow himself and only foresaw that one of his confederates might 
commit the crime.48 As I mentioned, the Cambodian Tribunal later 
declared that JCE III was never part of customary international law,49 
meaning that various individuals languishing in prison were probably held 
responsible based on a contentious reading of custom. Quelle horreur! 
 A universal set of standards defining international criminal 
responsibility with some precision in a separate treaty or UN Model Law 
would preclude a repeat of the type of radical disaccord that resulted in the 
context of JCE III (to name only one example), obviate the need to 
consistently interrogate the content of state practice, and reinforce the 
ability of international criminal justice to exemplify liberal notions of 
punishment, symbolically if not in reality. At least with respect to forms of 
responsibility, this move away from custom would also transcend the need 
for the ICC Statute to preserve the parallel development of customary 
international law.50 If standards of responsibility are settled, coherent, and 
universal, ongoing developments in custom would just replicate the worst 
features of the system as it presently stands. On all counts, a system 
without customary international law is preferable.  
   
                                                
46 Van Schaack, supra note 2. PAGE NR? 
47 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 204. 
48 In fact, there is good authority for the idea that the standard is actually objective 
foreseeability, lowering the mental element required for JCE III even further. 
49 I accept, of course, that this ruling only purported to pertain to the earlier period when 
the Khmer Rouge’s crimes were perpetrated, but the fact that both courts drew heavily on 
WWII caselaw, that the Cambodia decision explicitly disagrees with interpretations 
offered in Tadić, and that relatively little happened between 1975 and 1993 suggests that 
the two are probably in direct conflict. 
50 See infra, note 6. 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 19 
   
G. Overcoming Western Technocratic Legalese 
 
 In the past years, the ICC has embraced German criminal theory as a 
tool to interpret its own statute. Initially, the ICC adopted ‘control over the 
crime’ as a means of distinguishing perpetrators from accomplices. This 
was then followed by the adoption of German theories of co-perpetration, 
indirect co-perpetration, and even perpetration through a bureaucracy. 
There is much excellent scholarship written on each of these theories that 
offers insightful explanations of these concepts; how they are necessary, 
normatively justifiable, and map onto the realities of international crimes 
in Africa and beyond. A major difficulty, however, transcends the 
normative coherence of the scheme itself. Is all this immense complexity 
comprehensible to those affected by the trial, most notably, the defendant? 
Here, I confess grave concerns that the technocratic vernacular might be 
alienating, and that adopting a different set of standards may have more 
universal appeal. 
 At least since Durkheim, punishment has sought to express moral 
opprobrium in ways that are constitutive of a moral community. In the 
English-speaking world, this expressive theory of punishment was 
popularized by Joel Feinberg, who argued that  
 
punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of 
those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.51  
 
At an international level too, this idea of punishment as communication 
has caught on,52 largely as a product of its (apparent) ability to tolerate the 
great selectivity of international trials. But, if expressivism is to play any 
role in accounting for the curious phenomenon of international 
punishment, the message it conveys must surely be intelligible. 
 At present, I fear that it is not. While German criminal theory is often 
exceptionally insightful, categorically precise and analytically rigorous, I 
wonder how well it expresses condemnation internationally. When 
onetime President of Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, was indicted by the 
ICC, the BBC article reporting the news had to place the term ‘indirect co-
                                                
51 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
98 (1974). 
52 Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of  International Punishment: The Limits of 
the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 39 (2007); MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
173–180 (2007); Bill Wringe, War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: 
Communication or Denunciation?, 16 RES PUBLICA 119 (2010). 
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perpetration’ in inverted commas like this, in order to mark the 
technocratic legalese it had no expectation its readers would understand.53 
I have no reason to suspect that the accused, the victims, Ivoirians, or 
anyone else without a solid training in German criminal law will 
understand the label any better. In fact, I suspect that, like me, many 
senior practitioners within this discipline also struggle with the concept, 
marking an important divide between the strength of the rule in the body 
of the donor system, and its functionality once transplanted into the 
international.54 
 These misgivings are also making themselves known in formal 
pronouncements of international courts themselves. In a very interesting 
separate opinion in the Ngudjolo Chui judgment before the ICC, Judge 
Christine van den Wyngaert expresses her doubts about the cultural 
appropriateness of German terminological distinctions for global blame 
attribution:  
 
I doubt whether anyone (inside or outside the [Democratic Republic 
of the Congo]) could have known, prior to the Pre-Trial Chamber's 
first interpretations of Article 25(3)(a), that this article contained such 
an elaborate and peculiar form of criminal responsibility as the theory 
of "indirect co-perpetration", much less that it rests upon the "control 
over the crime" doctrine.55  
 
A global concept of criminal participation that had genuinely universalist 
pretensions would overcome this technicality, ensuring that the important 
communicative aspirations of punishment are not consistently lost in 
translation. Indeed, given the recent history of colonialism, the racial 
backgrounds of indictees presently on trial before the ICC, and 
longstanding criticisms about this from the African Union and TWAIL 
scholars, should we not attempt to minimize Western technocratic 
legalese? To anticipate arguments of those who will feel this history most 
keenly, the challenge is to resist normative systems that (again) seem 
                                                
53 Ivory ex-leader charges revealed in John James, Ivory Coast: Gbagbo faces murder 
and rape charges , BBC NEWS, November 30, 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15960254 (last visited Dec 4, 2012). 
54 My apologies to Máximo Langer for labouring the transplant metaphor he 
convincingly discredits. See Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal 
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in 
Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). 
55 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, No.: ICC-01/04-02/12-XX[insert individual 
nr], Judgment, (18 December 2012).  
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine 
Van den Wyngaert, para. 20. 
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culturally alien, morally superior, and largely insensitive to the needs of 
affected societies.  
 
H. A Didactic Function for Western States Too 
 
 In keeping with the colonial history just mentioned, the passage of law 
to the ‘uncivilized’ was often accompanied by a one-sided didactic 
attitude. Aside from acting as a particularly sharp tool for ensuring peace, 
order and security on terms favorable to colonial masters, the criminal law 
was also a mechanism for educating ‘savages’ in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition.56 Apart from colonial imperalism, other western states have also 
exported their criminal laws to the periphery. The United States, for 
instance, has also become a prominent exporter of criminal procedure (and 
the institution of corporate criminal liability).57 Likewise, Markus Dubber 
uses a clever parallel to draw in the criminal law tradition that recently 
infiltrated international criminal law when he jests that: ‘the Sun never 
sets on German criminal theory’.58 The criminal law everywhere is very 
heavily influenced by European history. 
 The danger is that these legal transplants give off an unjustifiable 
impression that law manufactured in the donor states is beyond reproach. 
On closer inspection, western systems are almost never conceptually 
pristine, and frequently, they could also benefit from the good example a 
universal concept of participation could provide. For instance, if we can 
agree that culpability is the touchstone of criminal responsibility, which is 
as close as one can get to a universally accepted principle in criminal law 
theory, then we quickly realize that even dominant Western systems 
depart from this principle habitually. In England and Wales, strict liability 
is widespread (and growing),59 murder does not even require an intention 
                                                
56 Makau Mutua askes these questions of human rights, but his criticism frequently draws 
on international criminal law and the history of western atrocities. See Makau Mutua, 
Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 202 
(2001). 
57 Elisabetta Grande, Comparative Criminal Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 191–209 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (“the US 
system, ... while being the major exporter of categories and concepts in substantive civil 
law, does not perform the same role in substantive criminal law”). 
58 Dubber, supra note 23 at 1298. 
59 In a survey of 165 new offenses created within England and Wales in 2005, Andrew 
Ashworth shows that strict liability was sufficient in 40%, plus an additional 26% were 
strict liability but watered down slightly by a proviso that the offense must be carried out 
“without reasonable excuse.” Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Law, Human Rights and 
Preventative Justice, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION 
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to kill,60 and joint criminal enterprise is good law.61 In the United States, 
Pinkerton liability, felony-murder, and the natural and probable 
consequences rule in complicity cases, all do similarly.62  Should 
international criminal law not set a standard that exposes these excesses to 
correct for their corrosive influence?  
 The gap between theory and practice in Germany is undoubtedly less 
intense, but it is also unmistakable. To filter out causal contributions that 
are minor, remote, unusual or that involve third party interventions, for 
example, all German academics agree that a concept called objective 
attribution (objektive Zurechnung) is necessary;63 but German courts do 
not apply it in practice.64 On issues of complicity, too, many crimes under 
German law require a causal link between action and prohibited 
consequence, but courts reduce the accomplice’s contribution to a 
furtherance formula (‘Förderungsformel’), according to which, the aider 
and abettor need not have caused but must have actually furthered 
(‘tatsächlich gefördert’) the perpetrator’s crime.65 As one might expect, 
the vast majority of German academics strongly disagree with this 
approach on the grounds that it unjustifiably discards causation.66 In short, 
no system of criminal law achieves perfection. 
 So why do I labour these shortcomings, when all of these systems have 
so much to offer international criminal justice? My point is only that 
international criminal responsibility should have a didactic function that is 
universal in reach, instead of replicating a civilizing agenda that has 
historically been very one-sided. After all, some of the leading criminal 
                                                                                                                     
AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW (Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie, & Simon 
Bronitt eds., 2008). 
60 ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 244 (6th ed. 2009) (“[In English 
criminal law there are now two alternative fault requirements for murder: an intent to kill, 
or an intent to cause grievous bodily harm.”). 
61 For a justification of JCE in English criminal law, see Andrew Simester, The Mental 
Element in Complicity, 122 L. Q. REV. 578, 599 (2006). 
62 Paul H Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 617–618 (1983). 
63 H. KORIATH, KAUSALITÄT UND OBJEKTIVE ZURECHNUNG 15 (1st ed., Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007), (discussing the implications of normative attribution); M. MAIWALD 
KAUSALITÄT UND STRAFRECHT. STUDIEN ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NATURWISSENSCHAFT 
UND JURISPRUDENZ 4-5, 9 (Munich: Grundlegend, 1980). 
64 CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TEIL I: GRUNDLAGEN. DER AUFBAU DER 
VERBRECHENSLEHRE: BAND I 351 (4., vollst. neu bearb. A. ed. 2005). 
65 RGSt 58, 113 (114-115) (Entscheidungssammlung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 
Vol. 58, p. 113, at pp. 114-115). See also, CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER 
TEIL BAND II : BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT, 2003, § 26 marginal 
number 186, at p. 194. 
66 See, WOLFGANG JOECKS, in: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd von 
Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch. Band 1 §§ 1-51 
StGB, 2003, § 27, marginal numbers 23-37. 
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theorists of our time support tasking international criminal law with this 
heavy burden. According to George Fletcher, ‘the task of theorists in the 
current century is to elaborate the general principles of criminal law that 
should be recognized not only in the International Criminal Court, but in 
all civilized nations’.67 A universal system of participation in international 
crimes could go some way to achieving these lofty educative goals for 
developing and developed countries alike. 
 
I. Enabling Practice 
 
 The current doctrinal heterogeneity in modes of participation is no 
friend to practitioners. To recall, practitioners are required to have some 
appreciation of forms of attribution at three competing levels: (a) 
customary international law; (b) the ICC Statute; and (c) national legal 
systems. Some would also add a fourth, namely (d) criminal law theory, in 
that one cannot assume that any of these sources are necessarily 
conceptually defensible. This expectation is onerous, especially when 
some of the key national concepts are incorporated into international 
criminal law from countries whose languages are not official to the courts 
in question, and when most practitioners come to the discipline with 
experience in domestic criminal practice or international law rather than 
comparative criminal law or theory. I here sketch some of the possible 
distortions this reality produces and the ways a universal standard might 
account for them. 
 First, modes of participation are presently very difficult for 
practitioners to identify. The past decade of litigation has produced 
moving goalposts, making it extremely difficult to litigate cases. Now JCE 
best captures the realities of responsibility during atrocity, but suddenly 
JCE III’s very existence is put in question. Is indirect perpetration the 
superior mechanism for describing the responsibility of superiors? What 
exactly does this mean? In order to differentiate between co-perpetrators 
and accomplices, we must recognize that co-perpetrators make essential 
contributions whereas accomplices do not, but atrocity is frequently 
overdetermined, so perhaps we water the ‘essential contribution’ standard 
down somewhat.68 Complicity might criminalize too much in our 
imperfect world, so best append an element like ‘specific direction’, no 
matter whether it accords with custom, precedent or orthdox theory.69 The 
                                                
67 GEORGE FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2007). 
68 James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189 (2012). 
69 See infra, note 34. 
2013] TEN REASONS FOR ADOPTING A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT 24 
   
chameleon-like status of these forms of participation is extremely difficult 
to work with. 
 Second, the current diversity of modes of participation promotes 
experimentation. International institutions tend to be populated by many 
highly intelligent people, young and old, who are eager to ‘solve’ the 
dilemma of international criminal attribution once and for all. This well-
intentioned desire often falls victim to competing national perspectives on 
criminal law, overly romanticized visions of these domestic legal systems, 
and the influence of individuals capable of speaking languages that allow 
them to span discourses at the three (sometimes four) levels I mention. As 
part of this process, one assumes that modes of attribution can be 
‘tweaked’ upwards here and downwards there to create the optimal 
solution. The problem is, without any unified vision of how this should 
take place or a shared commitment to foundational issues in criminal law 
theory, these ‘tweaks’ create an unending cascade of change. Needless to 
say, it is hard to litigate cases of enormous factual complexity, based on 
legal standards that are in a constant state of flux. 
 Relatedly, the obvious danger is that those who are called to decide 
these issues are unable to inform themselves of the underlying principles 
to their own satisfaction. Which exceedingly busy judge has the time 
necessary to study comparative criminal theory? This understandable 
difficulty risks precluding genuine dialogue among colleagues and, 
thereby, the emergence of shared understandings on issues of great 
importance. Expertise in modes of attribution requires knowledge of 
issues at three (and probably four) levels as mentioned above, specific 
linguistic skills, an ability to follow developments across numerous fields 
and a general openess to conceptual issues. Therefore, modes of 
participation risk being dismissed as too complicated or overly academic 
for practitioners. Why debate indirect co-perpetration if you neither 
understand the concept fully nor grasp its necessity? Thus, practioners 
understandably fall back on the law they know from home and a ‘do-the-
basics-right’ attitude.  
 Unsurprisingly, this fall back position can produce important internal 
factionalisms between different national camps, which are detrimental to 
the working experience of those involved and unproductive for the overall 
delivery of justice. Admittedly, the intense culture of denial about the 
inevitable psychic impact of atrocity on practitioners (especially the 
natural correlation with anger) might be the more important causal 
influence of this antipathy, but I still believe that a universal notion of 
participation would help resolve these internal tensions considerably. A 
universal concept of participation could answer many of these legal 
questions up front, establishing a common structure with some greater 
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degree of certainty while simultaneously minimizing opportunities for 
conflict. Perhaps, it might even help develop a mature sense of autonomy 
and an independent criminological self-understanding particular to the 
discipline.  
 Accordingly, universalization of participation in atrocity would enable 
justice, rather than deferring to the radical heterogeniety of legal doctrine 
that presently govern participation in international crimes at international 
and national levels. As I have shown, the content of these forms of 
participation international criminal law unquestioningly couples with is 
frequently more the product of historical chance than underlying cultural 
values worth venerating. Without doubt, a universal concept of 
participation would not prevent legal disputes about participation, 
overcome the different socialization of practitioners on these issues, or 
foreclose the value of national criminal law in thinking about these 
questions, but it would improve the day-to-day realities of practice 
considerably. At present, practitioners are unduly bogged down by a set of 
basic legal questions that are unlikely to be resolved through litigation in 
the near term, necessitating a quite different approach. 
 
J. Cost Savings 
 
 International criminal justice is expensive. As is well known, the two 
ad hoc UN international tribunals alone are estimated to have claimed 
roughly 15 percent of the United Nations annual budget over the past 
decades, with an estimated cost of around $25 million per case.70 
Admittedly, it is exceptionally difficult to quantify the portion of that 
figure attributable to the unsettled heterogeneous nature of international 
modes of attribution. Still, limiting litigation over these concepts would 
certainly free up considerable capacity, save donors resources, and hasten 
the trials some have colorfully described as being ‘as annoying and 
interminable as the Tour de France’.71 Just a short glance at the number of 
appellate cases that involve complex questions about modes of 
participation confirm as much. Here, I detail two such examples that a 
                                                
70 UNSC, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict 
Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004); 
Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539 (2005) (calculating average cost of trials as $25 million 
per case). 
71 PIERRE HAZAN & JAMES THOMAS SNYDER, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE 
STORY BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 187 (2004) (citing Jacob Finci); 
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single universal concept of participation would improve upon, if not 
eliminate. 
 On 29 November 2002, Dragoljub Ojdanić filed a motion before an 
ICTY Trial Chamber challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to try him 
using JCE as a mode of attribution, a notion the statute did not explicitly 
mandate.72 This challenge to jurisdiction delayed his trial during the time 
necessary to consider the motion, and produced the usual set of 
memoranda in a system characterized by an exceptionally high rate of 
written submissions: the Prosecution responded a fortnight later and the 
defendant filed a written reply early in the New Year, after the Christmas 
break. On 13 February 2003 the Trial Chamber rendered its decision 
dismissing the challenge to jurisdiction, upon which Ojdanić quite 
appropriately exercised his right of appeal. The appeal initiated a second 
round of written briefing, before a bench of the Appeals Chamber met in 
late March 2003 to confirm that the appeal indeed related to jurisdiction. 
Six months later, the Appeals Chamber rendered its final decision – JCE 
was indeed a part of the ICTY’s jurisdiction. 
  It is hard to know how much time, resources, and human capital were 
invested in each step of this procedure (not to mention the costs associated 
with delaying the trial). Nevertheless, this anecdote again raises questions 
about the propriety of leaving modes of attribution to the vagaries of 
customary international law.  Would it not be better to be clearer about the 
content of criminal responsibility well in advance, such that the very 
existence of a key concept in blame attribution cannot reasonably be 
called into question at an interlocutory phase? To be clear, I am not 
opposed to challenges to jurisdiction per se (they serve an important 
function in some contexts), but it is the height of inefficiency to be 
litigating the existence of a basic form of participation that should be 
defined within a court’s statute. A universal theory of participation would 
not preclude challenges to jurisdiction, but it would minimize the need for 
modern courts to spend so much precious time and resources on very basic 
issues.  
 These costly inefficiencies are not limited to the ad hoc tribunals. The 
current debate at the ICC around ‘control over the crime’ as a mechanism 
for differentiating perpetrators from accomplices is a case in point too. To 
recall, up until the first trial judgment of the ICC in Lubanga, all pre-trial 
chambers had interpreted Article 25(3)(a) as requiring control over the 
crime, a concept borrowed from the German theorist Claus Roxin. Within 
                                                
72  All this procedural history is set out in the Appeals Chamber’s final decision. See 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub 
Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, 1-4 (21 May 
2003). 
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the Lubanga trial judgment, Judge Fulford penned a lengthy dissent 
disagreeing with the invocation of this theory, since the Statute made no 
explicit reference to it. Although a differently constituted Chamber 
acquitted Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui without broaching the subject, Judge 
Van den Wyngaert offered a concurring opinion that joined in the 
skepticism.73 Of course, I do not doubt that these questions are 
normatively significant, but I do wonder whether litigation is the most cost 
effective manner of attempting to resolve them.  
 If precious resources required for defence, prosecution, and judiciary to 
persistently circle around these questions were saved, they might open up 
greater possibilities for a whole range of programs that improve 
institutional responses to mass violence. This includes greater possibilities 
for victim compensation, better media outreach to affected communities, 
superior investigative capacities, more structural assistance to the defence, 
and so forth. If cost savings need not necessarily be spent within the 
institution itself, they could also allow for greater use of truth and 
reconciliation commissions or other transitional justice processes at the 
national level. Perhaps, the funds might even be invested in projects that 
alleviate structural causes of atrocity, like dysfunctional judicial 
apparatuses, endemic poverty, and natural resource predation. The point 
is, we should not forget that the absence of clarity on these core issues of 




 In this paper, I offer ten rationales for adopting a single universal 
notion of participation in international crimes. This universal concept 
would travel with international crimes, such that anytime an international 
crime was charged, we would know what modes of attribution apply. All 
national and international courts would employ this form of participation 
when hearing cases involving international crimes, thereby circumscribing 
what responsibility for atrocity means globally. I have attempted to leave 
to one side what the content of this universal notion of participation 
should be, in the hope of showing that the structural problems within the 
system as presently constituted are more the responsibility of academics 
and states than judges or litigators. I hope to have at least raised the 
question whether we academics are not better placed to resolve some of 
these core issues among ourselves, then advise states accordingly? If one 
feels skeptical about the ability of scholars to reach consensus on issues of 
this sort than translate this consensus into practice, recall that in 1902, a 
                                                
73 See infra, note 55. 
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congregation of the Union International de Droit Penal (UIDP) held in St. 
Petersburg agreed on a particular theory of blame attribution.74 Professor 
Franz von Liszt, one of the organization’s founders, was such an ardent 
supporter of the theory that he argued it should feature as a central part of 
‘the unification of criminal codes’, and the ‘universalization of criminal 
law’.75 Given that the UIDP boasted over twelve hundred members from 
over thirty countries at the time, this history is encouraging. Moreover, 
after the endorsement, a number of the UIDP’s members lobbied 
successfully for the amendment of their own domestic criminal codes.76 I 
believe academics in international criminal law should attempt something 
similar. 
 
                                                
74 BULLETIN DE L'UNION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL Vol 11 137 (1904). The 
Congress endorsed the unitary theory of perpetration, but in keeping with my agnosticism 
here, I am more interested in the fact of agreement than the content. 
75 LEON RADZINOWICZ, THE ROOTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
LAW AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE: A TRIBUTE AND A RE-ASSESSMENT ON THE CENTENARY 
OF THE IKV 24 (1991). 
76 The countries are Denmark, Norway, Austria, Italy and Brazil. I discuss this history in 
a forthcoming work. See James G Stewart and Asad Kiyani, Pluralism by Unification: 
Towards a Single Concept of Participation in International Crimes (forthcoming) 
